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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
SECURITIES CREDIT CORPORATION, A CORPORATION,
Appellant,
Case No.

-vs.-

MARION WILLEY, dba

~fARION

8041

WILLEY & SONS,
RespMtdent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts of
the appellant as set forth in appellant's brief so far as
the facts are stated.
However, respondent denies the conclusions inserted
by the appellant in its Statement of Facts. On page three
of Appellant's brief, the appellant in the next to the last
paragraph sets forth:
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"Paragraph 3 of the Counterclaim alleges
that the sale of the automobile by Barrett to the
Respondent was with full knowledge and consent
of the Respondent."
rrhere appears to be a mistake in the last word of the
paragraph which should have read "Appellant", not "Re~pondent''

The additional facts to be stated are in the main contained in the Respondent's lterrogatories served upon
the Appellant, (R. 20) and the Answers To Interrogatories To Plaintiff (R. 22) made by the appellant:
INTERROGATORY NO. 1
1. In paragraph 1 of the complaint the plaintiff alleges it is the owner of the subject automobile and entitled to possession of same. (a) From whom was the
automobile purchased
ANSWER: The Plaintiff received an assignment of the
contract of sale from the Motor Center of Pocatello,
Inc., of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho.
(b) When and where was it purchased.
ANSWER: The contract for the sale of said car was
purchased on the 9th day of September, 1952 at Pocatello,
Idaho.
(c) Was ti tie issued in name of plain tiff.
ANSWER: Title was issued showing plaintiff as lienholder by virtue of conditional sales contract, which had
been assigned to plaintiff.
(d)

When did plaintiff get possession of same.
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ANSWER:

Plaintiff did not take possession of said car.

(e) When did plaintiff part with possession of
sa1ne
.A.NS,VER: (No answer given)
(f) To whom was possession relinquished by plaintiff .
.A. NSvVER: (No answer given)
(g) How much did plaintiff pay for said autonlobile, to \vhom, and when.
.A. NS\Y.ER: The plaintiff paid $2439.51 to Motor Center
of Pocatello Inc. upon the 9th day of S.eptember, 1952.
(h)

Describe the document by "\vhich plaintiff clain1s

title
ANSWER: Certificate of title of motor vehicle issued
by the Department of Law Enforcement, No. 818165, and
conditional sales contract assigned to p-laintiff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2
Does the plaintiff have a certificate of title to said
vehicle. If so, when and where was the same issued and
by whom.
ANSWER: Yes, the same was issued September 16,
1952, at Boise, Idaho, by the Department of Law Enforcement,
INTERRO·GATORY NO.3
Is plaintiff acquainted with Edwin S. Barrett or Edw.
S. Barrett of Pocatello, Idaho. If so, has plaintiff had
any business transactions with hin1 during the past two
years
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ANSWER: Yes, plaintiff has had business transactions
with Edward S. Barrett of Pocatello, Idaho, during the
past two years.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4
State the nature of business done with Edw. S.
Barrett during the past two years.
ANSWER: The nature of the business done with Edward S. Barrett was financing motor vehicles.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5

Has plaintiff done any business with Motor c·enter of
Pocatello, Inc., during the past two years. If so, state
the nature of the business.
ANSWER: Yes, the plaintiff has done business with
Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., during the past two
years. The nature of the business has been the financing
the sale of automobiles, flooring automobiles and various
types of financing.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6
Has plaintiff financed any automobiles for Edw. S.
Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., during
the past two years.

ANSWER: Yes.
IN·TERROGATORY NO. 7
List the date, amounts advanced, and the description of any automobiles finaced by plaintiff for Edw. S.
Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., during
t~e past two years.
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ANSWER: A full and complete answer to this interrogatory would require a complete audit of the Edward
S. Barrett and Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc. accounts
extending over the full period of two years and would be
burdensome upon the plaintiff. Innumerable transactions
have occurred during the last two years and the ferreting
out of each one would an1ount to a Herculean task.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8
What if any docwnents were executed at the time of
the alleged purchase of the subject automobile. Were any
of these documents recorded; if so, when and where.
ANSWER: Assignment of conditional sales contract;
execution of certificate of title by the Department of Law
Enforcement; application for transfer of title made by
Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., to cause title to be issued
in name of the plaintiff. The assignment of contract was
recorded in the office of the Department of Law Enforcement, Boise, Idaho. Application for certificate of title in
name of plaintiff was filed with the department of La'v
Enforcement. Copy of the conditional sales contract was
filed with the Department of Law Enforcement.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9
State the name and address of any persons who purchased any automobiles from Edw. S. Barrett and/or
Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., which had been financed
by you during the past two years.
ANSWER:

(Same as No.7)
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INTERROGATORY NO. 10
Does Edw. S. Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., owe you any money. If so, state how much~
the dates the obligations were incurred, and the amounts
which have been paid on the obligations since September
15, 1952.

.AN~ \VER: rrhe exact amount of debt is not now known
to the plaintiff. The nature of said indebtedness is conditioned and conditional upon plaintiff's fully collecting
t·ontraets which have been assigned to plaintiff. One debt
of $528.00 is liquidated. This debt was incurred July 17,
l!J55. No payments have been made upon the liquidated
debt and no definite amount has been estimated on the
conditional debts.
INTERROGATORY NO. 11
Has any action been commenced by plaintiff against
Edw. S. Barrett andjor Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc.,
within the past four months. If so, describe the action
taken, the purpose thereof, and the present status thereof.
ANSWER: No.
INTERROGATORY NO. 12
State the names and address of any witnesses to
matter~ alleged in the complaint.
ANSWER: Edward S. Barrett, John Rademacher,
Charles E. Crawshaw, Evan F. Olson, all residents of
Pocatello, Bannock County, State of Idaho.
The Respondent alleged by way of counterclaim (R.
3) :
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"1. On or about the 15th· day of September,
1952, defendant purchased a new 1952 model Mercury automobile, four-door sedan, Motor No. 52
LA 27, 188M, from one Ed Barrett doing business
as Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., at 628 North
Main Street, Pocatello, Idaho, as an authorized
dealer in new Mercury Automobiles, for a total
sum of $2650.00 fully paid by Defendant to said
seller.
2. No certificate of title was delivered to defendant upon delivery of said automobile by the
said seller for the reason advanced by the seller
that none had been issued. Defendant has since
January, 1951, purchased some fifteen new Mercury automobiles from said Ed Barrett and Motor
Center of Pocatello, Inc., and each of said vehicles
was delivered to defendant without certificates of
title but the defendant obtained certificates of
title upon said new automobiles in the State of
Utah. Defendant had no notice of any _claim of
the Plaintiff whatsoever until more than one
month after said purchase was completed.
3. The sale of the said automobile by said
seller to defendant was with the full knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff.
4. By provisions of the laws of the State of
Idaho, and the State of Utah, the Plaintiff has no
right, title or interest in or to said automobile
or any claim against the defendant.
5. The defendant is entitled to a decree of
this court quieting title to said automobile in defendant and declaring that plaintiff has no right,
title, interest or clain1 therein.
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WHEREF'ORE defendant prays that the
(~otnplaint be held for naught and that judgtnent
he rendered quieting title to said automobile in the
. .
"
defendant, and for the defendants costs.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
There are two principal ~~uestions for decision:
POlX'T I
WHETHER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE
.\PPELLANT'S COMPLAINT.

POIXT II
WHETHER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT UPON THE
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE RESPONDENT .

.A.RGL":.\IENT
POINT I
WHETIIER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPO:ND:SNT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT DISMISSING THE
i\.PPELL.A.NT'S COMPLAINT.

A determination should be made at the ou.tset as to .
\vhat are pleadings for the purpose of a }fotion F·or
~T udgment

On the Pleadings, and particularly "\vhether

answers to Interrogatories are pleadings. Rule 7 (a) of
TJtah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
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...7(a). PLEADINGS. There shall be a coinplaint and an answer; and there shall be a reply
to a counterclaiin denoininated as such; an answer
to a cross-claiin, if the ans,ver contains a crossclaim: a third party con1plaint, if leave is given
under Rule 14 to sutnmon a person 'vho was not
an original party; and there shall be a third
party answer, if a third party complaint is served.
No other pleading shall be allowed, except that
the court may order a reply to an answer or a
third party answer."
There is no mention that Interrogatories To Parties
or the answers thereto are pleadings. It is the contention
of the Respondent that Answers To Interrogatories are
pleadings whenever the Answer to Interrogatories
relates to an issue raised by the allegations of a complaint, answer or counterclaim. In support of the contention that answers to Interrogatories are pleadings,
Respondent refers by analogy to the use, function and
designation of a Bill of Particulars under the former
Code of Civil Procedure. The Utah Code Annotated,
1943, 104-6-3, provides:
ENUMERATED. "The only pleadings allowed on the part of the plaintiff are:
104-6-3.

(1) The complaint.

(2) The demurrer to the answer.
(3) The reply.
And on the part of the defendant:
(1) The demurrer to the complaint.
(2) The answer.
(3) The demurrer to the reply."
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No mention is made of a Bill of Particulars as being a
pleading.
Utah Code Annotated 1943 104-13-3 provides:

'

'

104-13-3. "AN ACCOUNT, HOW PLEADED
-BILL OF PARTICULARS. It is not necessary
for a party to set forth in a pleading the items of
an account therein alleged, but he must deliver to
the adverse party, within ten days after a demand
therefor in writing, a copy of the account, or be
precluded from giving evidence thereof. The
court, or a judge thereof, rnay order a further
account when the one delivered is to too general
or is defective in any particular."
.A. Bill of Particulars \\~as so held to be a pleading by

the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Inland Engineering & Construction Compa'ni!J vs. Maryland Casualty
Comapny, et al., 76 U 435, 290 P 367, decided July 21,
1930, wherein the Inland Engineering brought suit
against a subcontractor and the surety for the subcontractor for an alleged failure to complete construction
of a road as per contract. The Defendants demanded a
bill of particulars, and the trial court ordered the Plaintiff to supply a bill of particulars, but none was in fact
filed by the Plaintiff. Judgment in the lower court was
for Plaintiff, but reversed and remanded by the Supreme
Court because Plaintiff failed to file the bill of particulars.
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The Supren1e Court rnade, these pertjnent statetnents at page 447:
.. The Statute relating to a Bill of Particulars
is largely a rule of pleading relieving a pleader
from the necessity of pleading each item unless
required by the adverse party upon demand for
a more particular and complete statement.''
At page 447 quoting fron1 1J!Ior·ri.sette, Execu.tor vs
TV ood, 1:2S Ala. 505, 30 So. 630, 631 :
'~The

word 'account' has no clearly-defined

meanrng.
"A bill of particulars has been held proper in
actions based upon common counts .... libel and
slander; ejectment; trover, trespass .... "

At page 451:
"Whenever a den1and for bill of particulars
relates to an issue raised by allegations of a complaint, an answer or a counterclaim, its proper
classification must be a pleading, which should be
filed as ordered b.y the court in this case, and the
issues cannot be ·said to be made up or the case
be at issue until such has been done."
HHow can a court rule upon the admissibility
of evidence relating to matters set out in a bill
of particulars unless a bill is filed and is before
the court as a part of the pleadings limiting and
defining the issues. The authorities seem to be
well nigh unanllnous that in a proper case, where
bill of particulars is permitted, the bill limits or
enlarges the issues of proof."
Under our present lTtah Rules of Civil Procedure in
absence of the use of a bill of particulars, provision is
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made for other types of discovery among them being,
Interrogatories to Parties as provided by rule 33 Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. The last paragraph of rule 33
provides in part as follows:
''Interrogatories may relate to any matters
which can be inquired into under Rule 26 (b), and
the answers may be used to the same extent as
provided in Rule 26 (d) for the use of the deposition of a party. Interrogatories may be served
after a deposition has been taken, and a deposition may be sought after interrogatories have been
answered, but the court, on motion of the deponent or the party interrogated, may make such
protective order as justice may require."
Rule 26 (d) paragraphs 1 and 2 provide as follows:
"'(1) Any deposition may be used by any
party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness.
(2) The deposition of a party or of any
one who at the time of taking the deposition was
an officer, director, or managing agent of a public
or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a party may be used by an adverse
party for any purpose."

It clearly appears from the wording of rnle 26 (d)
that the Interrogatories to Parties may be used upon the
hearing of a motion, and that the deposition of a party
may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
Since a bill of Particulars was not denominated by
the Code of Civil Procedure as being a pleading but was
by decision of .this court declared to be a pleading when
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relating to an issue raised by a eontplaint, ans\ver or
counterclaim, and since the use of interrogatories perforins a function under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure comparable to the functions of a bill of particulars
under the code of Civil Procedure, then even though the
litah R,ules of Civil Procedure do not specifically denominate Interrogatories to Parties and~e.answers thereto
as being pleadings, yet the same should be so considered
\Yhenever the answers to interrogatories relate to an
issue raised by a complaint, answer or counterclaim.
At the bottom of Page 7 of Appell~nt's brief, appellant contends that if answers to interrogatories are considered pleadings, then it would be impossible to 1nake a
~Iotion for Judgment on the Pleadings because the pleadings 'vould never be closed. Of course, technically, pleadings are not closed until the time of trial since it is possible to amend the various pleadings, but there being no
n1otions.to amend, pending., for all practical purposes and
for purposes of Motion for Judgment On The Pleadings,
the pleadings are closed. Likewise, though the Appellant
1night have interposed interrogatories to be answered by
the Respondent, yet there having been no interrogatories
pending, unanswered, at the time of Motion For J udgment On The Pleadings, the pleadings were closed.
The complaint of the Appellant substantially followed Form 16 of forms set out in the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and alleged in paragraph 1 of the complaint (R. 1) :
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"1. Plaintiff is the owner and entitled to the
possession of the following described personal
property located in Bountiful, Utah: A 1952
~1:ercury four-door sedan, Motor No. 52 LA-27,
188-M.''
J>aragraph 2 of the complaint alleges possession in the
respondent, paragravh 3 alleges a demand for possession
and refusal, and paragraph 4 alleges damages.
rrhe action COlninenced by the Appellant was solely
one of replevin. Replevin is defined in Corpus Juris
~ecundum, Volume 77, Page 10 as being an action at law
for the recovery of specific personal chattels, wrongfully
taken and detained or wrongfully detained. At page 13
of said Volwne 77, it is stated that replevin is a possessory action in which the gist of the action is the plaintiffs
right to in1mediate possession of the property and the
defendant's wrongful taking or wrongful detention of
the property. Again at page 29 of Volume 77, Corpus
Juris Secundum, it is stated that since replevin is strictly
a possessory action, it lies only in behalf of one entitled
to immediate, exclusive and unqualified possession as
against the defendant at the time of commencing the
action, and if there is any preliminary act or condition
precedent to be perfor1ned before the unqualified right
of possession attaches, the action cannot be maintained.
The complaint alleges as a conclusion that the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to immediate possession of
the automobile. In answer to interrogatory 1, appellant
answers that it is a lien holder by virtue of a conditional
sales contract which had been assigned to appellant by
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Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., and that appellant had
never ta.ken possession of the car, thus contradicting, or
at least qualifying, the allegations of the complaint. As
a conditional seller, the appellant had no right of possession except upon default under the contract, but the
appellant did not allege a contract or the default thereof, or any other allegations supporting the ap·pellant's
right to immediate possession. In answer to Interrogatory No. 10, the appellant states that Edw. S .
. Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., owed
appellant some conditional obligations but that only one
debt of $528.00 was liquidated. In answer to Interrogatory No. 11, appellant admits that no action was taken
against Edw. S. Barrett and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., within four months prior to December 13,
1952, which indicates that no action was taken after
Septe1nber 9, 1952, the date which appellant claims to
have acquired an interest in the car. In its affidavit of
Replevin (R. 19), appellant deposes upon information
and belief that Respondent claimed to have purchased
the car from Edward S. Barrett. The appellant could
not have maintained replevin against Edward S. Barrett
and/or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., without alleging
and proving a default under the contract. In the case of
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., et al., 106 Utah 166, 146
P2d 284, in which Calhoun purchased a car from a dealer ~
the dealer assigned the contract to Universal Credit Co.,
who repossessed the car without knowledge or consent
of Calhoun after Calhoun was in default of payments
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under the contract. There was evidence that Calhoun
had been given extensions on previous instaln1ents. Calhoun brought action for conversion recovered judgment
' by the Supreme
in the trial court. which was affirmed
(~ourt holding at Page 174:
''Thus until notice of intention to enforce the
forfeiture provisions of a contract was given, and
a reasonable tiine to comply with the demand for
payment allowed, an indefinite extension of tin1e
would not expire, and defendants could not repossess the automobile."
The Appellant contends (App. Br. 25) that it was
entitled to bring replevin and cited Morgan vs. Layton,
GO Utah 280, 208 Pac. 505; however that case was one in
'vhich the complaint alleged the 1nortgage, the default
thereof and the provisions which entitled the Plaintiff to
possession, and the Supreme Court held further in that
case:
"The possession acquired by the Plaintiff
under judgment of the court, however, is not an
absolute, unqualified possession. It is li1nited by
the purposes for which it was obtained, viz., in
order to foreclose the mortgage by advertise1nent
and sale as provided by law. For that purpose,
and that purpose only, the Plaintiff is entitled to
possession of the property."
The Appellant in answer to the interrogatories
admitted . that it had never had possession of the car,
that no action has been commenced against Motor Center
of Pocatello, Inc., andjor Edward s. Barrett, that no
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payYnents had been made upon the liquidated debt and
no definite ruuount had been estimated on the conditional
debts, and that there were no liquidated debts owing
from Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc., and/or Edward S.
Barrett except a debt of $528.00 arising on July 17, 19-53,
all of which clearly indicates that no procedure declaring
forfeiture under the conditional sales contract had been
taken; and that Appellant could not have been the "o,vner
and entitled to possession" of the car.
The Idaho Code 49-401 (e) entitled "Definitions"
provides:
49 Idaho Code 401 "D·efinitions''
" (e) Owner-A person who holds the legal
title to vehicle or in the event vehicle is the subject of an agreement for the conditional sale or
lease thereof With the right of purchase upon performance of the condition stated in agreement
with an immediate right of possession vested in
the conditional vendee or lessee or in the event a
mortgagor of vehicle is entitled to possession, then
such conditional vendee or lessee or mortgagor
shall be deemed the owner for purposes of this
chapter."
Idaho Code 49-416 further provides:
"In the event of the transfer of ownership of
a motor vehicle by operation of law as upon
inheritance . . . . . or repossession is had upon
default in perfor1nance of the terms of a conditional sales contract ..... the department of la'v
enforcement may upon the surrender of the prior
certificate of title, or when that is not possible,
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upon presentation of satisfactory proof to the
department of ownership and right to possession
of such motor vehicle and presentation of an
application for a certificate of title, issue to the
applicant a certificate of title thereto. Only an
affidavit by the person or agent of the person to
whotn possession of the rnotor vehicle so passed,
~etting forth facts entitling him to such possession and ownership, together with a copy of the
journal entry, court order or instrument upon
which such clairn of possession and ownership is
founded, shall be considered satisfactory proof
of ownership and right of possession. If the
applicant cannot produce such proof of ownership
he may apply directly to the department of law
enforcement and sub1nit such evidence as he may
have and the department of law enforcement may
thereupon, if it finds the evidence sufficient, issue
·
a certificate of title to the applicant."
The Appellant contends that it was entitled to produce facts as set forth on Page 14 of its brief, assuming
that the court was proceeding under the Summary JudgInent procedure. However, the court did not consider
1natters outside of the pleadings and the Summary Judglnent procedure was not applicable. Nevertheless, even
though the facts which appellant sets forth on page 14
of its brief were admitted, these facts ta~en with the
answers to interrogatories would show nothing more
than a lienholder's interest in the appellant and would
not avail the appellant under its allegations in replevin
\Vh'ich appears to be a mistaken remedy in absence of
allegations in the complaint in addition to the conclusion
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that plaintiff is "owner and entitle·d to possession" of
the car. The appellant n1a.de no attempt to amend the
con1plaint.

POINT II
WHETHER FROM THE PLEADINGS THE RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A JUDGMENT UPON THE
THE COUNTERCLAIM OF THE RESPONDENT.

The Respondent's counterclaim, (supra page 7)
seeks equitable relief by way of quieting title to the ear
in the Respondent as against the appellant. The success
of the counterclain1 depends upon the proof of a purchase
or acquisition by the Respondent under circumstance
which would constitute the claim of the Respondent
superior to and prior in right to that of the appellant.
The trial court could prop·erly find such proof in the
pleadings from the following pleadings.:
(a) The Affidavit of Replevin (R. 19) of the appellant alleges under oath, that "affiant is informed and
believes and therefore alleges, that the defendant clain1s
to have purchased the property from one Edward R. ,
. Barrett but Affiant further alleges that said Edward
S. Barrett does not have title nor right to possession to
said automobile."
From this affidavit Appellant admits the existence
of the claim of Respondent to have purchased the car
from Edward S. Barrett; the allegation that Edward f<.
Barrett "does not have title nor right to possession to
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:"aid automobile'' is not an allegation that Edward S.
llarrett did not have title and right to possession at the
t i IllP of sale and transfer of possession to Respondent.
(b) By the answer to Interrogatory No. 1, Appellant answers that it is a lienholder under a conditional
~ales contract an'd that Appellant had never taken pos~ession of the automobile.
(c) Answering interrogatories Numbers 3, 4, 5, and
n, the appellant answers that during the past two years
_t\.ppellant had been financing motor vehicles, flooring
automobiles and supplying other types of financing for
Edward S. Barrett and Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc.
(d) R.espondent by interrogatory No. 7 requested
the Appellant to list the date, amounts advanced, and
the description of any auton1obiles financed by the Appellant for Edward S. Barrett and/or ~fotor Center of
l_)ocatello, Inc., during the past two years. The Appellant answered :

"A full and complete answer to this interrogatory would require a complete audit of the
Edward S. Barrett and Motor Center of Pocatello,
Inc. acounts extending over the full period of two
years and would be burdensome upon the Plaintiff. Innumerable transactions have occured during the last two years and the ferreting out of
each one would amount to a Herculean task.
Again by interrogatory No. 9 the Respondent re-
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quested Appellant to state the na1ne~ and address0s of
any persons who purchased any auton1obiles fro1n
Edward S. Barrett and/or 1\tiotor Center of PoeatPllo,
Inc., \vhich had been financed by the Appellant during
the pa:St two years. In response the Appellant gavP
ans\Yer the same as its ans,ver to Interrogatory No. 7.
(e) Answering Interrogatory No. 10 Appellant
stated that the exact an1ount of the debt was unknown;
that only one debt of $528.00 "~as liquidated and was
i..11curred July 17, 1955 (1953).
(f) Answering Interrogatory No. 11 Appellant
admitted that no action whatsoever had been taken
against Edward S. Barrett or Motor Center of Pocatello, Inc.
From the foregoing it \vould appear that the n1ost
the Appellant could offer by way of proof is that it held
a lien by reason of a conditional sales contract; that a
certificate of title showed Appellant as lienholder; that
.:\ppellant had for more than two years been financing
automobiles under various plans for E'dward S. Barrett
and ].Iotor Center of Pocatello, Inc., to the extent that to
enumerate the transactions would constitute a "Herculean task".
This would resolve the issue as to \vhether one who
finances a dealer in new automobiles, flooring plans,
demonstrators and various other types of financing, can
claim priority by reason of a reeorded lien as against
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one who purchases the automobile from the dealer but
l'a'ils to obtain a certificate of title at the time of
}>Urchas<l.
rrhe Appellant urges that the Respondent could not
acquire any interest in the automobile without first having issued to him a certificate of title, and cites both the
ldaho Code and the Case of L'UX vs. Lockridge, 65 Idaho
G39, 150 p. (2d) 127 (App. Br. 23), in support of this
argument. Lu.x vs. Lockridge did not hold that there
could be no sale without a transfer of title, but held that
one could not be a bona fide purchaser under circum~tances

of that case without first receiving a certificate

of title.
The case of Swartz vs. White, 80 U 150, 13 p (2d)
(i43, cited by the Idaho Court 'vas one wherein a

~Irs.

'Vhite owned a car and endorsed certificate of title thereto in blank and left it at her home. Stewart made a false
representation to Mrs. White's husband and obtained the
eertificate and possession of the car. The car was worth
about $400.00. Stewart filled in his name in the blank
in the presence of Swartz and received $125.00 from
Swartz and delivered the certificate to Swartz. Swartz
brings replevin claiming to be an innocent purchaser. On
appeal the Supreme Court held that in view of the notice
to Swartz of the delivery of the title in blank and the
.
'
requirements of the statute regarding receipt of a certificate of title before title passes, and the fact that Swartz
\Vas only going to pay $125.00 for an auto worth at least
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twice that figure, Swartz could not have been a bona fidu
purchaser. At page 158, the Court held:
"Without attempting to decide the complete
meaning or full operation of this provision of the
statute (registration), it is sufficient to say that
the circumstances in this case, in view of that
statute, amount to a flag of warning to any intending purchaser that there has been no completed
sale or transfer of title by the registered owner.
Swartz was thereby put on inquiry as to the
responsibility of Stewart and his right to dispose
of or pledge the car. By the possession which he
had Stewart could have been a buyer, or bailee,
or an agent with limited power to sell, or he could
have been as he was, in possession .by larceny
without any right whatsoever to transfer title."
The reference of the Utah Court to the registration
statute was not essential to support the decision of the
court, since the decision is supported by considerable
other evidence that s.wartz was not a bona fide purchaser.
The dissent opinion in Lux vs. Lockridge wherein
two of the five justices dissented contended that the
statute under consideration was never intended to have
application to the immediate parties, i.e., vendor and
vendee, but that the statute is clearly an Anti-·Theft Act.
The Supreme Court of Utah in cases subsequent to
Swartz vs. White, (supra) hold that equitable title to a
motor vehicle can be transferred without transfer and
issuance of a certificate of title.
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In the Case of Dahl vs. Prilnce, 230 p (2d) 328, ......
U ------ (1951), the plaintiff, auto dealer, took a Buick
auto1nohile in trade from one, Garn, but did not have the
certificate of title transferred to him at the Tax commission. A creditor of Gam attached the Buick while Garn
had it one day using it while Plaintiff repaired Garn's
truek. Plaintiff brings replevin against the Sheriff,
Prince. Judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed by the
Supre1ne Court which held that the plaintiff could
a<'quire equitable title without getting a new certificate
as required by 57-3a-72, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. The
court quoted from its previous holding in Jackson vs.
James, 97 U. 41, 89 P. (2d) 235, to the effect that a gift of
ownership to an automobile would be complete as between the donor and donee without change in registration, and that the statute makes the registration evidence
of title and ownership for the protection of innocent
fide purchaser.
The Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of
the purchaser from a dealer as against a finance company in Jones vs. Commercial Investment Trust, 65 U
151, 228 Pac. 896, wherein the Plaintiff purchased an
automobile from a dealer who was being financed by the
Defendant. Judgment for the Plaintiff was affirmed by
the court holding that the Defendant finance company
retaining legal title to the automobile but allowing a
dealer to exhibit the same and hold itself out as legal
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owner, with right to sell the same, is estopped to deny
the authority of the dealer to sell the vehicle to a bona
purchasers.
Again in the Case of Harrison vs . .Auto Securities
Co. et al., 70 U 11, 257 P 677, the Plaintiff purchased a
car in Price, Utah, from a dealer who had received it
from a Salt Lake dealer. The Salt Lake dealer was being
financed by the Defendant and the latter repossessed the
car by trick. Plaintiff sued for conversion and judgment
for the Plaintiff is affirmed on appeal, the Court holding that the Defendant was estopped and that where one
of two innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful
act of a third person, the·loss shall fall upon the one who
by his conduct created the circumstances which enabled
the third party to perpetrate the wrong and cause the
loss.
Appellant cites Idaho Code 49-404 (App. Br. 23)
contending that no interest to a motor vehicle can be
acquired without the issuance of a certificate of ti tie.
Ho,vever, this provision was not intended to ap·ply to a
dealer in Motor vehicles in transactions with another
dealer. The following provisions of the Idaho Code
should be considered
Idaho Code 49-130 (c) "Provided further a
registered dealer in motor vehicles shall not be
permitted to license his individual cars which are
being held for the purpose of being sold to the
public."
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Idaho Code 49-402 APPLICATION TO
CERT'AIN VEHICLES-EXEMPTIONS. "The
provisions of this chaper shall apply exclusively
to ·every motor vehicle required to be registered
with the department under the laws of this state
except any said vehicles owned by the federal
government excepting also vehicles exeinpt under
provision of section 49-108." (Farm equipment,
etc.).
DELIVERY OE_, CERTIFICATEOFTITLE UPON SALE OR DISPOSITION - RE-ASSIGNMENT BY DEALERS.
"No person shall hereafter sell or otherwise dj~
pose of a motor vehicle without delivery to the
purchaser or transferee thereof a certificate of
title with such assignment thereon as may be
necessary to show title in the purchaser .... provided that any dealer holding current dealer
license plates issued by this state, in lieu of having a certificate of title issued in the name of such
dealer, reassign any existing certificate of title
issued in this state.
49-403 Idaho Code

49-405 Idaho Code .... If a certificate of title
has not previously been issued for such motor
vehicle in this state, said application, unless otherwise provided for in this chapter, shall be accompanied by a proper bill of sale or a dully certified
copy thereof, or by a certificate of title bill of
sale or other evidence of ownership req~ired by
law of any other state from which such motor
vehicle was brought into this state.

In the case of a new motor vehicle being
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registered for the first time, no certificate or
title or registration shall be issued unless such
application is endorsed by an enfranchised ne'v
car dealer authorized to sell such new motor
vehicle. The department of law enforcement shall
retain the evidence of title presented by the applicant and on which the certificate of title is
issued....
49-421 Whoever shall . . . . operate in this
state a motor vehicle for which a certificate of
title is required, without such certificate having
been obtained in accordance with the provisions
of this chapter . . . . or whoever, not being an
enfranchised dealer, or acting upon behalf of such
dealer, shall acquire, purchase hold or display for
sale a new motor vehicle without having obtained
a certificate or title therefor is guilty of a Inisdcmeanor.
It will be noted that 49-130 (c) prohibits a dealer
from licensing his individual cars which are being held
for sale and that 49-402 indicates that the provisions of
the code cited by the Appellant do not apply to vehicles
not required to be registered.
By 49-403 it appears that a dealer acquires title and
can. transfer title without having a certificate issued in
his name. Also 49-405 provides that a dealer acquires
title to a new vehicle by a proper bill of sale. The provisions of 49-421 indicate that a dealer or one acting upon
behalf of such dealer can display for sale a new motor
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\'ehicle

\Vi thout

obtaining certificate of title thereto. To
~upport the contention that the vehicle was deemed new,
\\'P (~i te Idaho Code 49-401 (c) :
h

'Used \r ehicle' every motor vehicle, which

has been sold, bargained, exchanged, given away
or title transferred from the person who first
ae( tuired it from the manufacturing or importer,
dealer or agent of the manufacturer or importer,
and so used as to have become what is commonly
kno\\·n as 'second-hand' within the ordinary meaning thereof."
From an analysis of the Idaho Code it appears that
the provi8ions relied upon by the Appellant are not
applicable to dealers acquiring automobiles fro1n dealers
or others.
CONCLUSIONS

It is respectfully submitted that the pleadings clearly
tlstablish that Appellant had no standing upon its complaint in replevin, and that the Decree quieting title to
·lhe vehicle in the Respondent was fully supported and
justified.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE K. FADEL
Counsel for Respondent
Bountiful, Utah
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